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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOSE RUIZ, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Appellate Court No, 
940661-CA 
District Court No. 
910900648 
(Priority No. 15) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Pursuant to Rules 24 and 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Defendant/Appellee, Southern Pacific 
Transportation Company (hereafter "Defendant" or "Southern 
Pacific"), hereby files its brief in opposition to the brief 
filed by Plaintiff/Appellant, Jose Ruiz (hereafter "Plaintiff" or 
"Ruiz"). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court 
was correct in ruling that Plaintiff was not acting within the 
course of his employment and, therefore, could not bring an 
action against his employer, Southern Pacific, under 45 U.S.C. § 
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51 ("FELA"). The court below concluded "that defendant was not 
in the course of his employment as a matter of law," and granted 
summary judgment for Defendant. It is from this order only that 
Plaintiff appeals. It merely is the correctness of this ruling 
that is reviewed on appeal, and this Court may affirm the grant 
of summary judgment on any basis, even if not relied on below. 
Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 
1992); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 
(Utah App. 1994). 
The ruling of the lower court does not grant complete 
relief to the Defendant. The ruling only precludes the Plaintiff 
from maintaining an action under the FELA. Plaintiff also has 
sued the Defendant for common law negligence in a separate 
action. Jose Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 
Civil No. 940900197 (pending in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah). The resolution of this 
appeal will not affect that separate suit. 
FEDERAL STATUTE AT ISSUE 
The determination of the issue appealed by Plaintiff 
will require this Court to interpret 45 U.S.C. § 51 which reads, 
in pertinent part, as follows: 
Every common carrier by railroad while 
engaged in commerce between any of the 
several States . . . shall be liable in 
damages to any person suffering injury while 
he is employed by such carrier in such 
commerce . . . resulting in whole or in part 
from the negligence of . . . such carrier . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff cites also to the second paragraph of this 
statute. However, it is not relevant to the issue before this 
Court. The second paragraph only clarifies that an employee's 
duties for his employer furthers interstate commerce, for 
purposes of this statute, when the duties in "any way directly or 
closely and substantially, affect such commerce." As stated 
above, the issue here is not whether Ruiz was performing duties 
that furthered interstate commerce, but more fundamentally 
whether Ruiz was performing any employment duties for Defendant 
at the time he was injured. Since the court below found as a 
matter of law from the record before it that Plaintiff was not 
acting within the course of his employment, the issue of whether 
or not his conduct also furthered interstate commerce was 
rendered moot and was not decided. Likewise, this Court need not 
consider the second paragraph of 45 U.S.C. § 51 that was cited by 
Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The relevant facts of record relied upon by the 
district court are not disputed. Plaintiff simply argues for 
legal conclusions that the district court rejected. 
A. Relevant Facts 
1. Plaintiff seeks herein to recover from his 
employer, Southern Pacific, for personal injuries he sustained on 
May 18, 1990. Plaintiff's claim in this action is based solely 
upon the FELA. (R. at 1.) 
2. In May 1990, Plaintiff was an employee of 
Defendant assigned to work on Defendant's tracks and right-of-way 
at Lakeside, Utah which required him, and the other members of 
his work gang, to live at Defendant's work camp at Montello, 
Nevada. Montello is approximately 75 miles from Lakeside. (R. 
174-75. 254.) 
3. The entire work gang customarily gathered 
together at Montello at 5:00 a.m. and traveled together to the 
work site at Lakeside by company truck, which would take 
approximately two hours, during which time they were under the 
Defendant's control and direction and were paid for their time. 
(R. 175-76, 259-60, 304.) 
4. However, prior to the date of the accident, 
Plaintiff voluntarily requested permission not to travel to 
Lakeside with the other gang members in the company truck 
because, for his own convenience, he wanted to have his own 
vehicle at Lakeside with him so he could leave directly from 
Lakeside for his home in Ogden, Utah rather than returning that 
evening to Montello with his gang. (R. 175, 305-14, 498-99.) 
5. Plaintiff's request was granted by his supervisor 
with the understanding that since Plaintiff would not be under 
Southern Pacific's supervision Plaintiff would not be paid for 
his time nor reimbursed for his use of his own vehicle. (Id.) 
6. On the day of the accident, Plaintiff did not 
gather with the rest of the work gang in the company truck, or 
submit himself to the supervision or control of the Defendant, 
but left after the gang left, in his own car, in order to travel 
at and for his own convenience to the work site at Lakeside. (R. 
175, 311-15.) 
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7. On that day, Plaintiff's on duty point, for the 
purpose of receiving compensation, was agreed to be Lakeside. 
(R. 314, 414.) 
8. Plaintiff was not paid for the time he spent 
commuting in his car that day, nor was he reimbursed for his own 
use of his vehicle. (R. 176.) 
9. Plaintiff was injured in a rollover accident 14 
miles away from Lakeside, before he had reported for duty at 
Lakeside. (R. 166-68, 287, 395.) 
B. Irrelevant and Incorrect Statements of Plaintiff 
10. Defendant agrees that the agreement between 
Defendant and its maintenance of way employees ("Union 
Agreement") provides that normally "Employees' time shall start 
and end at regular designated assembly points." (R. 350, Rule 
22(a).) However, this fact, which was stated by Plaintiff, is 
irrelevant because Plaintiff did not assemble with his gang, nor 
submit himself to the supervision or control of the Defendant, at 
the designated assembly point at Montello on the day of the 
accident. At Plaintiff's request, he agreed with Defendant that 
on that day he would not assemble with the rest of the gang until 
he arrived at Lakeside. (See paragraphs 4-7 above.) 
11. Defendant also agrees that it provided living 
facilities at Montello for Plaintiff, but this fact also is 
irrelevant because Plaintiff was not injured at Montello, nor did 
Plaintiff assemble with this gang and submit to the supervision 
or control of Defendant at Montello. Under these facts, it is 
irrelevant that Montello be designated as the "headquarter" or 
"designated assembly point" for purposes of computing 
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compensation generally under the Union Agreement. Plaintiff was 
injured when he crashed while driving his own car, for his own 
purposes, 14 miles from the work site at Lakeside and 64 miles 
from Montello. (See paragraphs 4-7 above; see also paragraph 24 
of Plaintiff's Statement of the Facts.) 
12. Plaintiff is wrong in stating in paragraphs 14 
and 22 of his Statement of Facts that the Union Agreement 
entitled Plaintiff to be compensated for his personal commute on 
the day of the accident, and that his starting time, for purposes 
of compensation, could not be altered. The Union Agreement 
speaks for itself and does not state that employees are entitled 
to be paid for time spent using their own vehicles for their own 
purposes rather than time spent after assembling and submitting 
to the supervision and control of the Defendant for which it 
provides they are paid. To the contrary, the Union Agreement 
specifically provides that "[e]mployees shall not be allowed time 
while traveling . . . between their homes and designated 
assembling points, or for other personal reasons." (R. 369.) 
13. Rather than citing to the specific language of 
the Union Agreement, Plaintiff relies on the Declaration of 
Robert Douglas in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 417) as the basis for his statements in paragraphs 
14 and 22 of his Statement of Facts. However, plaintiff fails to 
inform the Court that Defendant moved to strike this declaration 
on the grounds that it lacks proper foundation and makes hearsay 
statements and improper conclusions of law in interpreting the 
Union Agreement. (R. 420-27.) 
14. Moreover, these incorrect statements are 
immaterial because, as Plaintiff admits at paragraph 28 of his 
Statement of Facts, a claim for violation of the Union Agreement 
must be brought within 6 0 days from the date of occurrence and no 
claim ever has been brought. There is no admissible evidence of 
record that Plaintiff was entitled to be compensated for his 
personal commute. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff is not entitled to pursue the instant action 
against Defendant to recover for his personal injuries because 
his injuries occurred while he was acting outside the course of 
his employment. Under the FELA, which is the legal basis for 
Plaintiff's action, Plaintiff only is entitled to recover from 
Defendant if he can prove he was injured because of Defendant's 
negligence while he was working in the course of his employment 
for Defendant. 
The facts of record are undisputed that rather than 
performing any duties for Defendant, Plaintiff was furthering his 
own objectives when he was injured while he was driving his own 
vehicle to Lakeside where he was to report to work. The law also 
is undisputed that the relevant factors to be considered in 
deciding this issue include the employee's ability to chose his 
own conduct and the employer's lack of control and supervision 
over the employee. All the cases cited by Plaintiff support this 
conclusion, even though many of those cases reach differing 
conclusions because of the different facts of each case. Choice 
and control are the critical factors this Court must consider in 
analyzing whether Ruiz's conduct was within or without the course 
of his employment when the accident occurred. 
Under this analytical framework provided by FELA case 
law, the only reasonable conclusion is that Plaintiff clearly had 
total control and freedom to choose what he would do on his way 
to the work site and when he would do it, as does every commuter 
on the way to work. Defendant, on the other hand, had no control 
over Plaintiff and received no benefit from what Plaintiff had 
chosen to do, and it would receive no benefit until Plaintiff 
arrived at the work site to perform his duties. Plaintiff simply 
was commuting, as the district court held, and all case law is in 
accord that commuters are not within the course of their 
employment under the FELA. 
Upon the undisputed facts and uncontroverted, relevant 
legal authority, summary judgment is necessary in this case 
because, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot prove he was 
injured while acting within the course of his employment. The 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed, and Defendant 
should be awarded its costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FELA ONLY APPLIES IF THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
Railroads are not insurers of the safety of their 
employees. In order to recover for on-the-job injuries under the 
FELA, an employee must prove the negligence of his employer. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Saxon, 284 U.S. 458, 
459 (1932); O'Hara v. Long Island Railroad Co., 665 F.2d 8, 9 
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(2nd Cir. 1981); Lessee v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 690 P.2d 
596, 599 (Wash. App. 1984). Even more fundamental, however, is 
the requirement that an injured employee must prove he was 
injured while acting within the course of his employment. Moore 
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 649 F.2d 1004, 1008 (4th Cir. 
1981); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wottle, 193 
F.2d 628, 629 (10th Cir. 1952), cert, granted, 343 U.S. 963 
(1952), and cert, dismissed, 344 U.S. 850 (1952); Williams v. 
Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 767 F. Supp. 756, 758 (E.D. Va. 
1991). It is this narrow, legal question of what constitutes 
course of employment that is now before this Court. If the 
undisputed facts indeed establish, as the district court found, 
that Ruiz was not acting within the course of his employment with 
Southern Pacific at the time he was injured, summary judgment was 
properly granted as a matter of law. 
Prior to 193 9, the FELA had been interpreted to provide 
a cause of action for on-the-job injuries only for employees who 
were "at the time of the injury engaged in interstate 
transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be 
practically a part of it." Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 
U.S. 493, 496-97 (1956), citing. Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western Railroad Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558 (1916). A railroad 
employee, thus, was not covered by the FELA even if he was 
injured while acting within the scope of his employment unless 
the specific activity he was doing at the time was in furtherance 
of interstate commerce. 
The 1939 amendment to the FELA, discussed by Plaintiff 
in his brief, merely abolished this "moment of injury" rule. 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. at 497-98. See also Reed 
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 351 U.S. 502, 504 (1956) . Hence, 
the FELA now covers a work-related injury when any part of the 
employee's duties furthers interstate commerce, directly, closely 
or substantially, even if the injury occurred while the employee 
was at the time performing duties not directly related to 
interstate transportation. 351 U.S. at 499. This point never 
has been disputed by Defendant. 
The 193 9 amendment is discussed here by Defendant only 
because Plaintiff argued that it was relevant to the issue before 
this Court. It is not relevant. This amendment did not expand, 
or even address, the fact that a railroad employee must be 
injured within the course of his employment to be covered under 
the FELA. Off duty injuries never have been covered and the 193 9 
amendment did nothing to change this fact. Nothing in this 1939 
amendment changes the conclusion "that Congress used the words 
'employ' and 'employed' in the statute in their natural sense, 
and intended to describe the conventional relation of employer 
and employee." Robinson v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 237 
U.S. 84, 94 (1915) . Hence, the single issue remains: "Was 
Plaintiff acting within the course of his employment with 
Defendant at the time he drove his car off the road?" If not, he 
cannot assert a negligence claim against Defendant under the FELA 
and this cause of action was properly dismissed as a matter of 
law.1 The law and facts support the conclusion of the district 
court in this regard. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE ROLLED HIS AUTOMOBILE 
ON THE WAY TO REPORT FOR DUTY. 
"Course of employment" is defined generally to mean 
that "the worker is doing the duty he is employed to perform." 
Black's Law Dictionary 352 (6th ed. 1990). This definition is no 
different under the FELA. See Rogers v. Chicago & North Western 
Transportation Co., 947 F.2d 837, 839 n.4 (7th Cir. 1991); Wilson 
v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 841 F.2d 
1347, 1352 (7th Cir. 1988), cert, dismissed, 487 U.S. 1244 
(1988). See also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 cmt. c 
(1958). As shown in the cases discussed below, which were cited 
by Plaintiff, the basic factors of the employer's control and 
supervision over the employee and the employee's lack of choice 
over his own actions at the time of injury remain the same. In 
the case at bar, an analysis of the facts as applied to these 
factors conclusively support the district court's holding that 
Ruiz was acting outside the course of his employment when he was 
injured. 
On the day of the accident, Plaintiff voluntarily chose 
to drive his own automobile rather than travel to the work site 
in Defendant's truck, as was the custom and practice. On that 
xAs noted above, if Plaintiff was not acting within the 
course of his employment he still can pursue his action against 
Defendant for common law negligence in the separate action he 
already has filed. See Jose Ruiz v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Company, Civil No. 940900197 (pending in the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of Utah). 
day only, Plaintiff decided when he would leave for the work 
site, and in fact left after the rest of the gang departed in 
Defendant's truck. Only Plaintiff had control over when he left 
to go to the work site, the condition of his automobile and the 
manner in which he drove it. Defendant had no ability to control 
or supervise Plaintiff, as it did the other workers who submitted 
to Defendant's control and travelled together in Defendant's 
truck under the supervision of the gang's foreman. Defendant 
received no benefit from Plaintiff's voluntary choice to reject 
Defendant's mode of transportation in order to further his 
private objective of taking his car to work with him so he could 
get home earlier that night. With these facts, relevant case law 
supports finding that Plaintiff was acting outside the course of 
his employment and that the FELA does not provide Plaintiff a 
cause of action against the Southern Pacific. 
The issue of when an employee acts outside the course 
of his employment has arisen under varying factual circumstances. 
Most analogous to the facts of the instant action are cases 
commonly referred to as "commuter cases." Commuter cases 
generally involve the factual situation of an employee travelling 
under his own volition, and without his employer's supervision, 
to or from his work site in a manner chosen by the employee 
without compulsion by the employer. In these cases, it is 
established that employees are outside the course of their 
employment even if they are on their employer's property or 
riding on their employer's train or vehicle. 
For example, Young v. New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Co., 74 F.2d 251 (2nd Cir. 1934), involved a fireman who 
had finished his run and had left his job. However, while on his 
way home, the fireman was riding on one of his employer's 
locomotives when he was injured. Judge Learned Hand found the 
fireman was not acting within the course of his employment at the 
time he was injured. As Plaintiff points out in his brief, a 
critical fact influencing Judge Hand in Young was that the 
plaintiff exercised his choice to get home on his employer's 
locomotive and that this choice "had nothing to do with his 
employment, and could scarcely concern his relations with the 
defendant." Id. at 253. On a second appeal, the court again 
held as a matter of law that the plaintiff was outside the course 
of his employment when he was injured. In this decision, the 
court considered to be significant the facts that the plaintiff 
had ceased the specific duties of his job, his pay had ended, and 
he chose the means by which he rode home. Young v. New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 79 F.2d 844, 845 (2nd Cir. 1935). 
The jury verdict for the plaintiff, consequently, was reversed as 
a matter of law. id. at 846. 
In another commuter case, Sassaman v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad Co., 144 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1944), a train dispatcher 
was held to be outside the course of his employment when he was 
injured while getting off of one of his employer's trains that he 
took from the station where he worked to the station where he 
lived after his day's work. Again, Plaintiff in the case at bar 
points out that the court in Sassaman, after discussing the cases 
Plaintiff relies upon in this appeal, held that Mr. Sassaman was 
outside the course of his employment, under the FELA, because he 
chose to ride his employer's train to get home instead of taking 
other available transportation. Id. at 953. The court found 
that it was significant that the plaintiff's employer did not 
compel the plaintiff in the mode of travel he used to get to and 
from the place he was to perform his duties. id. 
The employee's ability to choose also was considered to 
be a significant factor in Quirk v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis 
Railroad Co., 189 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1951), cert, denied. 342 U.S. 
871 (1951). In Quirk, the court affirmed an order of the 
district court that the plaintiff's decedent, who was a track 
foreman, was outside the course of his employment as a matter of 
law when he was killed while driving one of his employer's 
motorcars on his employer's track, since the plaintiff's decedent 
was doing so pursuant to his own choice. Id. at 100. He had the 
freedom of remaining where his work had ceased, being provided 
meals and lodging by his employer, or going home for the night. 
Id. Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff's decedent's 
mere use of the defendant's motorcar for part of his voluntary 
trip home would not "reestablish the relationship which the 
decedent by his voluntary act had previously severed." Id. at 
101. The court reasoned: 
Certainly it cannot be thought that this 
action of the decedent was for the purpose of 
discharging any duty incident to or in 
connection with his employment. When he left 
Muncie, he was engaged solely in a personal 
activity unrelated to his duties as an 
employee of the defendant. (Id. at 100.) 
Related to the employee's exercise of his own choice is 
the factor that the employer has no control over the employee or 
the risks the employee may take in order to get to or from the 
work site. This interrelationship between the employee's choice 
and the employer's lack of control was discussed in Williams v. 
Norfolk Southern Railway Co.. 767 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
In the Williams case, the plaintiff was a maintenance of way 
employee who travelled to his designated assembly point and back 
in different ways including on an Amtrak train with a pass 
provided to him by his employer. The plaintiff could get to the 
assembly point any way he chose, but he then completed the trip 
to the work site on his employer's rail sidecar. He was paid 
only after submitting himself for the ride on the defendant's 
sidecar. The plaintiff was injured on his way home while riding 
the Amtrak train. In holding that the plaintiff was outside the 
course of his employment, the court stated: 
The justification for the [commuter] rule's 
limitation of FELA coverage is the employer's 
lack of control over the risks associated 
with commuter travel. By limiting FELA to 
injuries suffered by plaintiff "while he is 
employed," Congress chose to limit FELA's 
additional burdens on employers to those 
risks over which the employer had substantial 
control. Amtrak travel, like private auto 
travel, had plaintiff chosen it, was not part 
of plaintiff's job, nor did Norfolk Southern 
have substantial control over the risks 
associated with either mode of travel . . . . 
In short, FELA was enacted to protect railway 
workers against the dangers of actual railway 
work, not against the risks of commuting. 
(Id. at 759.) (Emphasis added.) 
Although the foregoing cases involved commuting home 
from work, the same rule is applied with respect to employees 
commuting to work. In Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 
173 (1st Cir. 1959), a flagman was held to be outside the course 
of his employment when he was injured while travelling on his 
employer's train to join his crew at the point where he was to 
start his work. After reviewing the case authority, the court 
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found the plaintiff to have been outside the course of his 
employment because he was not required to be on his employer's 
train in order to get to work. Id. at 178. 
Choice and lack of control also was pivotal in 
Spoonamore v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 179 F. Supp. 
290 (E.D. Ky. 1959). Mr. Spoonamore was an engineer who was 
injured in an automobile accident while on his way to where he 
was to meet his train. In holding as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff was outside his employment at the time, the court 
stated that plaintiff's mode of travel "was entirely a matter of 
his own voluntary choice for reasons personal to him. It was a 
matter over which the railroad exercised no direction nor 
control." Id. at 2 92. 
In Getty v. Boston & Marine Corp., 505 F.2d 1226 (1st 
Cir. 1974), a railroad carman fell on his employer's property 
while going to board one of his employer's trains to travel to 
his place of employment. Again because the carman exercised his 
choice to use his employer's train to get to work, the commuter 
rule applied and the denial of FELA coverage was affirmed. Id. 
at 1228. The court in Getty makes it clear that the result may 
have been different if the carman had been required to face 
unique hazards or his freedom of choice as to means of travel had 
been taken away. Id. Again, choice and lack of control were 
considered as critical factors. 
The significance of these factors was highlighted again 
in the recent case of Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger 
Corp., 774 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. 111. 1991), aff'd, 966 F.2d 1457 
(7th Cir. 19 92). In the Thompson case, summary judgment was 
granted for the employer because its employee, a waiter, was not 
within the course of his employment when injured while riding on 
his employer's train to where he was to board his regular train. 
No issue of fact existed that the plaintiff was not required to 
ride his employer's train to work, and he was not at the time 
subject to the orders of his supervisors. Id. at 1088. 
Supporting the fact that the employer had no control over the 
plaintiff was the fact that the plaintiff was not paid for his 
time spent during the commute. Id. 
Applying the common factors considered by these courts 
compels the conclusion that the court below properly granted 
summary judgment for Defendant. Ruiz voluntarily rejected going 
with the Defendant to the work site on the day of the accident, 
although Ruiz had the opportunity to do so and in fact 
customarily had submitted himself to the control and supervision 
of Defendant on previous occasions in getting to the work site. 
Plaintiff elected to go to the work site by himself in his own 
automobile for his own personal reason of having his car 
available to him to use in getting home from work earlier. In 
other words, he did not have to drive to the work site in his own 
car in order to do his work that day. He voluntarily drove for 
his own benefit. 
In addition, because Plaintiff chose not to start his 
work at the work camp with his gang and go with them in 
Defendant's truck to the work site, Defendant had no control over 
when, or if, Plaintiff would leave the camp site or arrive at the 
work site to report for duty, nor did Defendant have any control 
over the Plaintiff's car or his use of his car. As further 
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evidence of the existence of these facts, Plaintiff voluntarily 
chose not to be paid until he reported for duty at the work site, 
and in fact, Defendant never has paid Plaintiff for that time he 
spent pursuing his own interests. 
This case falls squarely within the reasoning of the 
commuter cases that deny FELA coverage. Therefore, the court 
below was correct in granting summary judgment as a matter of 
law. 
POINT III 
THE LEGAL AUTHORITY RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF IS 
INAPPLICABLE ON THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT. 
Plaintiff does not deny the existence and affect of the 
line of cases known as commuter cases. In fact, he peripherally 
cites to many of those cases, yet without sufficient analysis to 
show that really they conclusively support the holding of the 
court below, in emphasizing other lines of cases. These other 
lines of cases apply to other factual situations that are 
inapplicable where an employee is travelling pursuant to his own 
choices and without the control or supervision of the employer to 
where he is to report for his work assignments. Plaintiff's 
cases, therefore, do not help Plaintiff on the facts of record 
before this Court. 
A. Work Camp Cases 
The first line of cases argued by Plaintiff pertains to 
the factual situation where an employee is injured at an employer 
provided work camp. These cases are referred to herein as "work 
camp" cases. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad 
Co. v. Kane, 33 F.2d 866, 868 (9th Cir. 1929), cert, denied, 280 
U.S. 588 (1929)(laborer who was preparing for the day at his 
employer's work camp was within his employment because "he was 
necessarily on appellant's premises, and was making necessary 
preparations for the work in which he was to engage"); Mostyn v. 
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 160 F.2d 15, 17-18 
(2nd Cir. 1947), cert, denied, 332 U.S. 770 (1947)(laborer who 
was asleep at his employer's work camp was within his employment 
because the camp was provided by the employer for its employees 
to use "to prepare themselves for their work, or to rest and 
recuperate"); Casso v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 219 F.2d 303, 
3 05-06 (3rd Cir. 1955)(laborer who was at his employer's work 
camp and was returning to his bunk car, after having been away at 
town, was within his employment for the reasons stated in Mostyn, 
supra, and the fact that the employees using this housing were 
subject to call at anytime of day or night); Atlantic Coast Line 
Railroad v. Meeks, 208 S.W.2d 355, 358-59 (Tenn. App. 1947) 
(laborer who was in his employer's "shanty car" was within his 
employment because the employer furnished the camp in order to 
have the services of the laborer and the laborer was subject to 
call at any time so as to make the laborer's staying at the camp 
a necessary incident to his employment). 
These work camp cases all involve negligence which 
occurred at the camp where the injured employee was required by 
his employer to stay. The employers in these cases clearly had 
control over the camp facilities and benefitted from the laborers 
staying at the work camps. These cases do not suggest that an 
employee choosing to leave a work camp in his own vehicle and for 
his own personal benefit remains covered by the FELA while he 
operates his motor vehicle at any speed and in any manner of his 
own choosing. Neither do these cases contradict the reasoning of 
the applicable commuter cases discussed in Point II. Indeed, the 
Second Circuit in Mostvn specifically followed its earlier 
decisions in Young v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Co., supra, and stated in its analysis "that any activity 
undertaken by an employee for a private purpose is certainly not 
within his employment." Mostyn, 160 F.2d at 17. 
The Tenth Circuit case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. Wottle, 193 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1952) particularly 
is instructive on this point. In Wottle, a laborer, shortly 
after returning from the work site to his company provided camp 
site, left in his own automobile to go buy groceries for himself. 
The laborer was killed while still on his employer's property 
when attempting to drive over the tracks. Id. at 630-31. The 
court in Wottle found that the laborer's own choice to drive his 
own car in pursuit of his own objectives was not a necessary 
incident to his employment so as to bring him within the coverage 
of the FELA. To rule otherwise, the court reasoned, would in 
effect mean that "there is no limitation upon the coverage [of 
the FELA] so long as there is a possibility that the employee 
will return to his work-a-day duties," and then stated, 
"[o]bviously, the legislation was not intended to go so far." 
Id. at 631. 
The Wottle decision was upheld recently in Loya v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 993 F.2d 1551 (10th 
Cir. 1993)(unpublished opinion which is attached hereto). In 
Loya, summary judgment was affirmed where a laborer had left his 
work camp to visit home, do laundry and buy particular foods he 
liked. It is noteworthy that he was held to have been outside his 
employment as a matter of law when he was injured while returning 
to his work camp in his own car even though he was paid a per 
diem while away. Even though he was compensated, because the 
laborer was returning from his own errands he was found not to be 
within the control of his employer. He was exercising his choice 
to pursue his own interests. 
There is no dispute in the law that even when an 
employee is at work and would be within the course of his 
employment that he can take himself outside of the course of his 
employment by voluntarily pursuing personal objectives. For 
example, in addition to the cases just discussed, in Fowler v. 
Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 638 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1981), 
summary judgment for the employer was affirmed for this reason 
where an employee, during a time he would have been within the 
course of his employment and while on his employer's property, 
voluntarily chose to pursue a personal motorcycle excursion 
during which he crashed while speeding. Also, in Rogers v. 
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 947 F.2d 837 (7th 
Cir. 1991) summary judgment again was affirmed in favor of the 
employer where an employee, during a layover at the employer's 
expense, voluntarily chose to jog on his employer's property 
where he tripped in a hole. By choosing to pursue personal 
activities that did not benefit their employer, and over which 
the employer had no control, these employees were not acting 
within the course of their employment, as a matter of law, when 
they were injured. 
In the case at bar, Ruiz was injured while driving his 
automobile for his own interest. He was not at the work site. 
He was not required to drive his own car in order to get to the 
work site that day. It was his idea and desire to drive his own 
vehicle that day. He was not under the control or direction of 
Southern Pacific at the time. Defendant did not receive any 
benefit from Plaintiff's choosing to drive his own car to the 
work site so he could conveniently get home sooner for the 
weekend. Plaintiff expressly agreed he would not be paid for the 
time it took him to drive to the work site in his own vehicle 
when he would have been paid had he travelled to the site under 
the supervision of his foreman in the company truck. Likewise, 
neither was Plaintiff injured while he was at the work camp. He 
was injured while pursuing his own interests. When he chose not 
to leave the work camp with his work gang in order to pursue his 
own interests he voluntarily took himself outside the course of 
his employment. The work camp cases relied upon by Plaintiff are 
inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
B. Traversing the Work Site Cases 
Plaintiff next relies on a line of cases that pertain 
to the factual situation where an employee is injured on or near 
his employer's property in order to perform the specific job to 
which he is assigned. These cases are different from the 
commuter cases because the employee is injured after arriving at 
the general area where his work is to be performed, and it is 
found that the employee's being in the area in which he is 
injured was necessary in order for the employee to get to 
precisely where he needed to be in order to accomplish his work. 
These cases are referred to herein as "traversing the work site" 
cases. See North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248, 
260 (1914)(fireman who already had reported for duty and had 
prepared his employer's engine for a trip on which he soon would 
be leaving remained within his employment when injured while 
walking within the employer's yard from the engine to an unknown 
location, but assumed to be an adjacent boarding house, of which 
there was no evidence to indicate that he was on a personal 
errand as opposed to performing his duty to his employer); Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917)(engineer who was 
injured when walking away from his employer's engine in his 
employer's yard after performing his duties, at the close of his 
shift, still was within his employment); Virginian Railway Co. v. 
Early, 130 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1942)(machinist who, after parking 
his car on his employer's lot, reported early to the shops where 
he worked then proceeded to walk in his employer's yard to a 
company endorsed lunch room established for the convenience of 
the employees, in order to get a cup of coffee, and was then 
injured in the yard on the way back to the shops to perform his 
duties was within his employment); Lukon v. Pennsylvania Railroad 
Co., 131 F.2d 327, 329 (3rd Cir. 1942)(laborer whose gang quit 
one-half hour early so that they could return their employer's 
tools to the tool house and who, without any tools, walked with 
his gang toward the tool house along the employer's right-of-way, 
which was in the same direction of his home and which was the 
course he usually took to leave his employer's premises, was 
within his employment when injured while on the right-of-way)2; 
Morris v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 187 F.2d 837, 841 (2nd Cir. 
1951)(employee who, after entering his employer's yard, had to 
cross over various railroad tracks to get to where he needed to 
be to report for work and perform his duties was within his 
employment when killed in the yard); Carter v. Union Railroad 
Co., 438 F.2d 208 (3rd Cir. 1971)(trainman who, after parking in 
a lot provided by his employer, was injured while walking across 
property owned by a third party, which the employer knew to be 
necessary in order for its employees to get to the shanty where 
they were to do their work, was within his employment); 
Caillouette v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad Co., 
705 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1983)(switchman who had arrived at his 
employer's yard and was injured when walking toward the carmen's 
shanty in order to call the yard master to request that an engine 
be sent to take him to the other end of the yard where he was to 
work that day was within his employment).3 
2The Third Circuit in the dissent of the more recent case of 
Sassaman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 144 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 
1944), discussed supra in Point II, confirmed that the plaintiff 
in Lukon was "still on the section on which he was ordinarily 
employed" when he was injured, yet because it was possible, 
although not customary, for the plaintiff to have taken another 
route home other than on his employer's property, the dissent at 
least thought the Lukon case had been overruled by the Sassaman 
case. 
3These cases often refer to, as does Plaintiff, two non-FELA 
Supreme Court cases, Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 
(1928) and Cudahv Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923). 
In both of these cases, the imposition of liability under the 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act was affirmed because there was 
found to be a "causal connection" between the injury and the 
employment. 276 U.S. at 158; 263 U.S. at 423-24. In both cases, 
the employee was killed while crossing over railroad tracks 
adjacent to their work places which they necessarily had to cross 
in order to get to where they needed to be to perform their 
In all of these traversing the work site cases, as 
opposed to the commuter cases, the employee was not pursuing his 
own interest, nor was he exercising his own choice as to the 
means by which he got to or from work. Rather in all of these 
cases, the employee already had arrived at work and was required 
by his employer to go in a particular manner to the place where 
the injury occurred as part of or in preparation for the 
performance of his duties. Clearly, what the employee is doing 
in these cases is for the benefit of his employer because it is 
incidental to the performance of his required duties. 
These cases provide no help to Plaintiff under the 
facts of record. Ruiz left the camp site to pursue his own 
objective, as discussed above with respect to Plaintiff's work 
camp cases, and he had not yet arrived at the work site before he 
drove his car off of the road. He was 14 miles away from where 
he was to report to his supervisor and obtain his assignment for 
the day. He had not yet reported to work, and he was not 
traversing the work site to get to the exact location where he 
was to perform his duties for Defendant on that day. 
duties for their employers. Hence, although only a "causal 
connection" between the injury and the employment was held to be 
sufficient under the state compensation act, the analysis still 
required, as do the FELA cases set forth in the text, that the 
injury resulted from a risk that the employee necessarily had to 
take and not a risk the employee chose to, but did not have to, 
take in order to perform his duties for his employer. 276 U.S. 
at 159 ("it was necessary for the employees, in order to get to 
the place of work, to cross the tracks, and they were in effect 
invited by the employer to do so"); 263 U.S. at 426 ("Parramore 
could not, at the point of the accident, select his way. He had 
no other choice than to go over the railway tracks in order to 
get to his work, and he was in effect invited by his employer to 
do so."). In the case at bar, Ruiz was invited to travel to the 
work site with his gang in Defendant's truck, but he voluntarily 
chose to drive his own car instead. 
The fact that Plaintiff was on Defendant's property at 
the time of his accident is not significant. The traversing the 
work site cases do not find the employee to be within his 
employment because he is on his employer's property. Many of the 
employees were on their employer's property in the commuter 
cases, discussed in Point II, and the employees in the Wottle, 
Fowler and Rogers cases, discussed above in this point, were on 
their employer's property at the time of injury, yet they were 
found not to be within the course of their employment at the 
time. Conversely, in the Carter, Bountiful Brick and Cudahy 
Packing cases the employees were found to be within the course of 
their employment when not on their employer's property. 
Obviously, the very nature of the traversing the work site cases 
most likely will place the employee on his employer's property at 
the time of injury, and at least very close to where the 
employee's duties are to be performed. Nevertheless, contrary to 
Plaintiff's suggestion, whether or not an employee is on his 
employer's property is not a determinative factor in the analysis 
of whether the employee is within the course of his employment at 
the time of injury. See also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 
229 cmt. c (1958) ("the fact that the acts are done upon the 
master's premises or with his instrumentalities is . . . not 
conclusive"). 
The law specifically provides that merely being on an 
employer's property in order to get to work, without the 
employer's control and the benefit to the employer that makes the 
reason for being on the property incidental to the employment, is 
not sufficient to bring the conduct within the course of 
employment. In Aldredae v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 20 
F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1927), cert, denied, 275 U.S. 550 (1927), for 
example, dismissal of an action was affirmed where the plaintiff, 
a switchman, was injured after he left his home to go to work and 
while walking along his employer's right-of-way. The court found 
the facts as follows: 
On the night of the accident he left his home 
to go to his place of work. For his own 
convenience, he chose a route along the right 
of way of defendant instead of along the city 
streets. Both routes were feasible. He was 
under no orders until he reached his place of 
work. This right of way was not a railroad 
yard through which he must pass to reach his 
place of work. While on the right of way and 
still a quarter of a mile from his place of 
work, he met with the accident. (Id. at 658-
59.) 
On these facts, the court held, "we reach the unavoidable 
conclusion that plaintiff was not engaged in interstate commerce 
at the time of the accident. He was not on duty; he was simply 
going to a place where he would be on duty." Ld. at 60. 
Likewise, in Svmonski v. Central Railroad Co., 131 A. 
628 (N.J. 1926), aff'd, 135 A. 921 (1927) a judgment in favor of 
recovery was reversed because the injury occurred while the 
plaintiff chose to walk along the defendant's right-of-way and 
tracks to get to the train station from where he would then 
travel to the roundhouse where he was employed to perform his 
duties. The plaintiff chose this route rather than to approach 
the station by way of stairs provided by the defendant. Hence, 
just as in the commuter cases, the plaintiff's exercise of his 
own choice and the defendant's lack of control prevented the 
plaintiff from being able to recover under the FELA, even though 
the employee was injured while on his employer's property. id. 
at 629-30. 
In the instant action, Ruiz had a way to get to the 
work site that was under the control of the Defendant. He could 
have travelled with the rest of his gang in Defendant's truck, as 
he had done prior to the accident. Had he done so on the day of 
the accident, Defendant could have assured his safety through, 
among other things, its maintenance of the truck, control of the 
speed it was driven and required use of seat belts. However, 
Plaintiff chose not to take advantage of the transportation 
provided by Defendant. Instead, for his own personal reasons, he 
chose to take his own car at his own time, and he crashed before 
he arrived at the work site. By driving his own car, Ruiz was 
not pursuing the interests of the Defendant. He was pursuing his 
own interests. This is not a case where Ruiz already had arrived 
at work and was necessarily traversing the work site to get to 
the exact location where he was to work that day. Plaintiff was 
exercising his own choice with respect to the manner and means by 
which he travelled to the work site. 
C. On Call Case 
Plaintiff also cites to Temple v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Cal.App.l Dist. 1980) 
which is an "on call" case. In Temple, a brakeman, who was on a 
layover, was involved in a car accident when responding to a call 
from his employer to return to duty. After his period of rest, 
he was required by his employer to be available to report back to 
work when called by the dispatcher. His time was not his own. 
Id. at 782. Because the employee's acts, at the time of the 
accident, were in response to the orders of his employer and were 
producing the result desired by his employer, it was held that an 
issue of fact existed as to whether he was within the course of 
his employment at the time. Id. at 783-83. 
Ruiz was not on call to respond to his employer's needs 
when driving his car for his own purposes, nor was he responding 
to an order of his employer. If he had been responding to his 
employer's orders rather than his own wishes, he would have 
submitted himself to the control and direction of his supervisor 
at the camp site with the rest of the work gang rather than take 
his own car and leave at a time of his own choosing. Indeed, 
Plaintiff's choice as to the time when he left the work camp was 
directly related to the speed at which he would have to travel to 
catch up with the company truck by the time it reached the work 
site. Defendant had no interest in Plaintiff leaving latter than 
the others in order to go to the work site, nor did Defendant 
have any interest in Plaintiff speeding in order to get to the 
work site on time. As the lower court found, Ruiz was no more 
producing the desired result of his employer when driving his car 
than any commuter travelling to a work site. It is significant 
in supporting this conclusion that at the time of injury 
Plaintiff could not be contacted or controlled by Defendant in 
any way, and Plaintiff understood he would not be paid while 
acting on his own time for his own benefit. 
Plaintiff has not refuted the legal authority of the 
commuter cases. He only has argued for the applicability of camp 
site cases, traversing the work site cases and an on call case to 
support his position. These cases, although endorsing similar 
principles of choice and lack of control as found in the commuter 
cases, are factually distinguishable and provide no support for 
Plaintiff upon the undisputed facts of record. There is no 
factual dispute that Plaintiff voluntarily chose to drive his car 
for his own benefit. Defendant received no benefit from 
Plaintiff's conduct, and Defendant had no opportunity to control 
or direct Plaintiff until he arrived at the work site. 
Plaintiff, however, crashed his car 14 miles before he arrived at 
the work site. As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot be found to 
have been within the course of his employment when he drove his 
car off the road before he arrived at where he was to work, and 
the summary judgment granted below should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The district court's ruling is consistent with and 
supported by FELA case law, as discussed above. There is no 
conflicting case authority. Plaintiff merely misconstrues the 
law for his own benefit. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's contentions of error, there is 
uncontroverted FELA authority for finding an employee to be 
outside the course of his employment when he voluntarily chooses 
to commute to work in his own vehicle on his own schedule and for 
his own benefit, during which time he was not furthering his 
employer's business and was not under the control or direction of 
his employer. Although no case is exactly on point factually, 
the commuter cases discussed in Point II, supra, provide the 
appropriate analytical framework and the closest analogy. These 
cases focus on the employee's exercise of his own choice and 
conduct for his own benefit and the employer's lack of control 
and supervision. In fact, although factually distinguishable, 
even the reasoning of the other FELA cases relied upon by 
Plaintiff support the ruling of the lower court. Hence, summary 
judgment is completely in harmony with FELA principles and case 
law. 
Plaintiff also suggests, without any legal authority, 
that the district court could not hold upon the facts before it 
that Plaintiff voluntarily took himself out of the course of his 
employment when he substituted personal transportation for 
company transportation for personal reasons, and removed himself 
from the control and supervision of his employer.4 Plaintiff 
did not elect to take his car to the work site for the benefit of 
the Defendant and this election in no way benefitted the 
Defendant. In reality, the contrary is true. Plaintiff's 
voluntary election resulted in his leaving the camp site later 
than his co-workers. Had Plaintiff travelled at the same speed 
of those travelling under the control of the Defendant, the 
Plaintiff's choice would have made it impossible for him to have 
been at the work site as early as the rest of his work gang. 
Defendant has no interest in its employees pursuing personal 
objectives that make them late for work or for its employees to 
speed in order to get to work because they have pursued their own 
objectives. It is ludicrous for Plaintiff to argue that, in 
essence, no matter what he did for personal reasons he could not 
4Before the court below, Plaintiff argued that 
45 U.S.C. § 152 prevented him from taking himself out of the 
course of his employment. Plaintiff has abandoned this argument 
on appeal for very sound reasons. See R. 479-81. 
remove himself from the course of his employment. The Wottle. 
Loya, Fowler and Rogers cases, discussed above, expressly negate 
this argument.5 There are no cases supporting Plaintiff's 
argument. 
In addition, Plaintiff tries to argue that genuine 
issues of fact exist. However, Plaintiff does not clearly 
identify any issue of fact and what conflicting evidence exists 
to which Defendant can respond. It appears that Plaintiff simply 
is trying to create an issue of fact by arguing that the Union 
Agreement required Defendant to pay Plaintiff for the time he 
spent driving his own car to work, and that this fact supports 
the legal conclusion that Plaintiff was within the course of his 
employment. This straw-man argument fails because there is no 
competent evidence of record that the Union Agreement required 
that Plaintiff be paid for the time he spent driving his own car. 
The Union Agreement expressly provides that employees will not be 
paid when travelling for personal reasons. (R. 369.) 
Moreover, even if Plaintiff was entitled to 
compensation under the Union Agreement, Plaintiff still would be 
outside the course of his employment. As in the Fowler case, 
when an employee who is at work pursues his own personal 
interests he takes himself out of the course of employment with 
respect to that activity; and as in the Lova case, this is true 
even when the employee is being compensated. Plaintiff clearly 
took himself out of the course of his employment by the very act 
of his pursuing his own interests separate and apart from his 
5See text, supra, at pp. 20-21. 
agreement not to be paid in exchange for being released by his 
employer from his usual and customary duties of reporting to work 
with his gang and submitting to his employer's control and 
supervision. Hence, Plaintiff was outside the course of his 
employment regardless of whether or not the Union Agreement 
allowed Plaintiff to claim pay during his commute as a 
contractual benefit of his employment. 
Finally, Plaintiff feebly argues that his agreement not 
to be paid in order to be free to pursue his own interests is an 
agreement to avoid FELA coverage in violation of 45 U.S.C. § 55. 
This argument is nonsensical. First, Plaintiff has not cited to 
any facts of record that the parties agreed that Defendant's 
future FELA liability would be limited. Plaintiff's voluntary 
agreement not to be paid for his time certainly was not done to 
limit FELA coverage. Nobody expected an accident to happen. 
This agreement simply is further evidence that, indeed, Plaintiff 
was pursuing his own objectives and not those of his employer, of 
which the legal result is that Plaintiff was outside the course 
of his employment and should not be paid. Second, if the case 
law is against Plaintiff on the course of employment issue, as 
established above, the FELA would not apply, including Section 
55. Plaintiff was outside the scope of his employment as a 
matter of law even if there had been no agreement regarding 
compensation. Thus, it would be irrelevant that the agreement 
not to be paid also limited FELA coverage. 
Plaintiff has not, and cannot, show any reversible 
error made by the district court. The law and the facts are 
clear and undisputed. Plaintiff's action fails as a matter of 
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law because there is no FELA coverage of his purely personal 
activity. The district court's ruling and order should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is not without recourse simply because the 
FELA is not applicable. Just as the FELA requires proof of 
negligence, so can Plaintiff pursue a common law negligence 
action against Southern Pacific as a landowner. In fact, the 
trial court advised Plaintiff of this option and Plaintiff has 
filed such a separate action against Defendant. 
With respect to the instant FELA action, however, 
Plaintiff was not injured while performing any activity required 
for him to be able to do his work. He was pursuing personal 
objectives in getting to work that benefitted only him, as does 
every commuter who elects to drive his or her own car rather than 
take other available modes of transportation. Plaintiff could 
have gone, and was invited to go, to the work site in Defendant's 
truck. Because Plaintiff exercised his freedom to chose his own 
desires rather than to report for duty at Montello, Defendant had 
no control or ability to supervise him at the time he was injured 
while he was driving his own car. 
Upon the undisputed facts, Plaintiff is not entitled to 
the benefits of the FELA because he was not within the course of 
his employment as a matter of law. The order of summary judgment 
in favor of Defendant must be affirmed. Pursuant to Rule 34, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court also should award 
Defendant its costs. 
Dated t h i s /<3^A day of June, 1995. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
'//! ^0\y^-
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ADDENDUM 
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NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished 
opinions remains unfavored, unpublished 
opinions may now be cited if the opinion has 
persuasive value on a material issue, and a 
copy is attached to the citing document or, if 
cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to 
the Court and all parties. See General Order 
of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. 
Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further 
order. 
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a 
"Table of Decisions Without Reported 
Opinions" appearing in the Federal Reporter.) 
Marta LOYA, as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Hector Loya, Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
v. 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-
Appellee. 
No. 92-1076. 
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. 
May 5, 1993. 
D.Colo., No. 91-N-575. 
D.Colo. 
AFFIRMED. 
Before MCKAY and EBEL, Circuit Judges, 
and LEONARD, District Judge. [FN1] 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*] 
EBEL, Circuit Judge. 
**1 The Plaintiff-Appellant's deceased 
husband, Hector Loya, was a maintenance-of-
way worker employed by the Defendant-
Appellee, Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company ["the Railroad"]. On 
Sunday, April 9, 1989, Mr. Loya was 
returning from his permanent home in Denver 
to his place of employment near Silt, 
Colorado, approximately 170 miles west of 
Denver, when he was severely injured in an 
automobile accident. Mr. Loya's co-worker, 
who was driving the pick-up truck at the time 
of the accident, lost control of the truck on a 
snowy interstate highway. Mr. Loya was 
thrown from the windshield of the truck into 
oncoming traffic and died of his injuries on 
May 2, 1989. 
Mrs. Loya brought this suit under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 
U.S.C. § 51, as personal representative of Mr. 
Loya's estate. The district court granted the 
Railroad's motion for summary judgment on 
the ground that Mr. Loya was not acting 
within the scope of his employment at the 
time of his injury and thus was not covered by 
the FELA. The Plaintiff now appeals the 
dismissal of her case. 
We review the grant of summary judgment 
de novo. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First 
Affiliated Sec , Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th 
Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there is no genuine dispute over a 
material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Rusillo v. 
Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th 
Cir. 1991). We view the record in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff. See 
Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski 
Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). 
We hold that , taking the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the 
Railroad is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Recovery under the FELA is permitted 
only if Mr. Loya's injury occurred "while he 
[was] employed by" the Railroad. 45 U.S.C. § 
51. We have interpreted this provision as 
imposing liability for "not only the actual 
work performed in interstate commerce, but 
those acts which can be said to be necessarily 
incident thereto." Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe R. Co. v. Wottle, 193 F.2d 628, 630 (10th 
Cir. 1952). However, we also recognized that 
the FELA was not meant to cover all of a 
railroad employee's activities: 
[G]iven the most liberal interpretation, the 
Act cannot be extended to cover activities 
not necessarily incident to or an integral 
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part of employment in interstate commerce. 
It obviously does not cover activities 
undertaken by an employee for a private 
purpose and having no causal relationship 
with his employment. 
Wottle, 193 F.2d at 630. Generally, 
employees injured while commuting to and 
from work are not considered to be within the 
scope of their employment for FELA purposes. 
See, e.g., Getty v. Boston and Marine Corp., 
505 F.2d 1226, 1228 (1st Cir. 1974); 
Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 
173, 178 (1st Cir. 1959); Quirk v. New York, 
Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 189 F.2d 97, 100 
(7th Cir.), cert, denied, 342 U.S. 781 (1951); 
Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 144 F.2d 950, 
952-54 (3d Cir. 1944); Williams v. Norfolk So. 
Ry., 767 F.Supp. 756, 758-59 (E.D.Va.1991); 
Spoonamore v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 
179 F.Supp. 290, 292 (E.D.Ky.1959). 
Although courts have been reluctant to 
establish a per se rule, this line of cases has 
led to a doctrine known as the "commuter 
rule." 
**2 The Plaintiff contends that Mr. Loya 
was under the Railroad's control and therefore 
was acting within the scope of his employment 
when the accident occurred. She cites several 
undisputed facts in support of this contention: 
(1) the movable nature of Mr. Loya's 
employment s i te-at which the Railroad 
provided living quarters in a railroad car 
outfitted with bunks, a kitchen, and a 
bathroom-created the necessity for travel, 
because his family could not live with him nor 
could his children attend school even if they 
could live with him at the work site, Aplt. App. 
D-25; F-34; (2) Mr. Loya's employment 
contract stated that "[w]hen conditions of the 
work permit," Railroad employees "will be 
allowed to make weekend visits to their 
home," Aplt. App. F-35; (3) Railroad 
employees unable to re turn to work on 
Monday were required to notify the Railroad's 
Division Offices by 7:30 a.m. Monday, 
Aplt.App. D-19; (4) Mr. Loya went to Denver 
to do laundry, see his family, and buy 
groceries because he could not read English 
food labels and the grocery stores near his 
workplace did not carry the Mexican foods he 
liked, Aplt.App. H-41, 46; and (5) Mr. Loya 
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Mi 
was paid a per diem of $9.95 per day, 
including Saturdays and Sundays, as long as 
he was not voluntarily absent from work on 
Monday and Friday, Aplt.App. D-20, F-34. 
Taking these facts as true, we nevertheless 
believe that no reasonable jury could find for 
the Plaintiff and that summary judgment was 
therefore proper. This case is governed by the 
commuter rule and Wottle. In Wottle, the 
railroad employee was responsible for 
providing food and bedding for his own use in 
the bunk car. We held that the employee's 
trip to purchase groceries could not be 
considered within the scope of FELA coverage 
because "he was on a mission wholly 
unconnected and unrelated to his 
employment." 193 F.2d at 631. Given that 
Mr. Loya made voluntary choices as to where 
to buy his food and how to travel to his 
permanent home, we decline to hold on the 
facts of this case that there existed the level of 
control by the Railroad necessary to constitute 
employment or acts incident thereto. Nor do 
we find indicative of Railroad control the fact 
that Mr. Loya had to notify the Railroad if he 
could not attend work on Mondays or the fact 
that Mr. Loya could be required to work on 
weekends. 
The major distinction between Wottle and 
Mr. Loya's case is that Mr. Loya received a 
daily per diem for the purchase of food and 
linens, even when he did not work on 
Saturdays and Sundays. Although pay can be 
an indicia of control by the employer and 
therefore an indication that Mr. Loya was 
within the scope of employment, the per diem 
in this case merely served as an incentive for 
Mr. Loya to come to work on Monday because 
per diem was not paid for the weekend unless 
the employee showed up for work on Monday. 
The payment of a per diem, in the absence of 
other evidence of control by the Railroad, does 
not indicate that Mr. Loya was acting within 
the scope of his employment at the time of the 
accident. 
**3 Indeed, a number of facts compel the 
conclusion that the Railroad exercised no 
control over Mr. Loya's weekend activities. 
Mr. Loya chose to go to Denver, chose when to 
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go to Denver and when to return to Silt, chose 
the means of transportation, and chose the 
route of travel. There are no facts supporting 
a finding that the Railroad exercised control 
over Mr. Loya at the time of the accident or 
that Mr. Loya was acting within the scope of 
his employment at the time of the accident. 
We therefore AFFIRM the district court's 
order granting the Railroad's motion for 
summary judgment. 
FN1. The Honorable Timothy D. Leonard, 
United States District Judge for the 
Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by 
designation. 
FN* This order and judgment has no 
precedential value and shall not be cited, 
or used by any court within the Tenth 
Circuit, except for purposes of 
establishing the doctrines of the law of 
the case, res judicata, or collateral 
estoppel. 10th Cir.R. 36.3. 
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